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Jury Selection in Two Countries: a 
Psychological Perspective 
VALERIE P. HANS 
Criminal Justice Program and Department of Psychology, 
University of Delaware 
A comparat ive  survey of jury select ion pract ices  in Britain and the United States 
indicates that the two countr ies d i f fer  along a number of dimensions, including the 
emphasis on the jury select ion process in the t r ia l ,  the amount and type of 
information avai lable about prospect ive jurors, and the frequency with which tr ia l  
lawyers a l ter  the composit ion of the jury. The probable impact  of these d i f ferences  
is analysed by considering the importance of jury composit ion in determining a 
jury's verd ict ,  the effectiveness of lawyers in exercising their  challenges, and 
broader effects of jury selection procedures in the two countries. 
One area in the psychology-law field that has engendered the theoret ica l  and 
pract ica l  involvement of psychologists is jury se lect ion.  Their presence is 
unders tandab le ,  s ince  many key issues in jury se lec t ion  are essent ia l l y  
psychological problems. The notion of the impart ia l  juror,  the e f fec ts  of individual 
character is t ics  on decis ion-making,  the assessment of community opinion about a 
case,  and the detect ion of bias in the courtroom are all questions well within the 
domain of the psychologist.  Accordingly,  several  psychologists have employed their  
theoret ica l  background and methodological  skills to assist attorneys with jury 
select ion in individual cases. However,  until recent ly ,  psychologists have d i rected  
re lat ively l i t t le  at tent ion to analysing and evaluat ing the re lat ive  e f f i cacy  of 
d i I Ierent  jury select ion procedures.  
The present review of jury select ion in Britain and the United States ol Amer ica 
is an e f fo r t  in this d i rect ion.  Both countr ies possess a common law her i tage of 
tr ia l  by jury, and their  c it izens share percept ions that  the composit ion of the 
jury is an important determinant of its verd ict .  Yet the two countr ies have 
developed radical ly d i f ferent  pract ices in jury se lect ion.  Dimensions along which 
Britain and the USA di f fer  include the importance and expansiveness of the jury 
select ion process,  the amount and type of informat ion avai lable about prospect ive 
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jurors, and the frequency with which tr ia l  lawyers alter the composition of the jury 
through challenges. 
Given the diverse ways in which juries are selected in the two countries, it is 
of interest to explore the l ikely effects of such differences. The objectives of 
this art ic le are twofold: f i rst ,  to review in a comparative fashion the jury 
selection procedures of Britain and the USA; and, second, to analyse the probable 
impact of differences in these procedures from a psychological perspective. 
THE REPRESENTATIVE 3URY 
The legal systems o£ both the USA and Britain share the ideal of the representative 
jury. In an extensive treatise on the British jury system, the Departmental 
Committee on 3ury Service stated that: 'It is . . .  inherent in the very idea of a 
jury that it should be as far as possible a genuine cross=section of the adult 
community' (Report of the Departmental Committee on 3ury Service, [965, p. t7). 
Similar ly,  in the USA, a long line of United States Supreme Court decisions has 
defined and upheld the right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of 
the community (Kairys, Schulman & Harring, 1975). However, only in the last decade 
have changes in the jury selection systems of both countries brought the real i ty  of 
jury panel selection more in accord with this ideal. Histor ical ly,  in Britain,  a 
property qual i f icat ion for jury service resulted in predominantly male juries with 
marked under-representation of ethnic and lower-class groups. Before 1972, 
e l ig ib i l i ty  for jury service was largely restricted to ratepayers, which in practice 
meant individuals who paid rates (taxes) on personally owned property. This 
qual i f icat ion typical ly el iminated wives l iving with their husbands, since husbands 
most often were listed as ratepayers, as well as any other adults in the household. 
It also excluded people l iving in lodgings or hotels. An additional restr ict ion was 
that the property had to be rated as at least £30.00 in the counties of London and 
Middlesex and at least £20.00 elsewhere (Report of the Departmental Committee on 
3ury Service, 1965, pp. 13-15). With the abolishment of the property qual i f icat ion 
in 1972, the representativeness of juries increased, but st i l l  falls short of 
adequately ref lecting the community. For example, Baldwin and McConville report 
(1979, 19g0) that in their 1975 study of Birmingham juries, about three-quarters of 
jury members were male, and people of New Commonwealth and Irish origin were 
signif icantly under-represented. 
The history of jury pool selection in the USA reveals striking parallels. Prior 
to 1968, a 'key man' system, in which key members of the community recommended 
people for jury service, was often employed in assembling jury panels. After the 
3ury Selection and Service Act of 1968, which mandated that voting lists be used as 
the source of jury pools, the representativeness of jury panels improved. But data 
collected in the last decade have consistently demonstrated that women, the young, 
racial minorit ies, and the poor are not represented on jury panels in proportion to 
their numbers in the population (Kairys, Schulman & Harring, 1975; Alker, Hosticka & 
Mitchell ,  1976; Van Dyke, 1977). While the use of addit ional source lists and 
increasing reliance on computer technology may improve the picture in the future,  
the ideal of the representative jury has not yet been real ized. 
Both countries provide for challenges to the jury pool or panel on the grounds 
that it is biased or non-representative, but these challenges are in i t iated rarely.  
In Britain, a recent challenge to the array by deIence counsel in a tr ia l  involving 
pol i t ical  and racial issues was thought to be the f irst t ime in over 150 years that 
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such a challenge had been mounted in England (Pithers,  1982a). In the USA, 
challenges to the panel are more frequent though for a number of reasons not often 
successful (c f .  Hans & Vidmar) 1982). In most cases in both countries, then, the 
jury is selected from a group which is only moderately representat ive of the 
community .  
INFORMATION AVAILABLE ABOUT PROSPECTIVE 3UROR5 
Britain 
In the typical  British case,  very l i t t le  is known about prospect ive jurors prior to 
the beginning of the tr ia l .  Each side is ent i t led to inspect a copy of the jury list 
before the tr ia l  opens, but the list contains only the names and addresses of jury 
panel members.  3urors' occupations were included on jury l ists until 1973, but in 
that year the Lord Chancel lor ,  who was concerned about the apparent use of 
occupation information by defence barr isters in exerc is ing peremptory chal lenges,  
ordered that jurors' occupations no longer appear on the l ists.  
In Britain, the provision of any addit ional informat ion about prospect ive jurors 
to part ies in a dispute will typical ly generate  considerable controversy .  The 
react ion to the discovery that in some pol i t ical  cases Crown prosecutors were 
consulting with the pol ice to obtain informat ion on jury panel members which later  
might be used to e l iminate jurors, a pract ice  dubbed 'jury vett ing ' ,  is a case in 
point.  In the 1978 prosecution of a soldier and two journal ists under the Off ic ia l  
Secrets Act ,  Crown counsel had checked the jury l ist with pol ice prior to tr ia l  to 
determine whether any prospect ive jurors were 'disloyal ' .  Defence counsel d iscovered 
this col laborat ion from a clerk of the court ,  and publicized it .  A huge public 
outcry fol lowed (Thompson, 1978) Harman & Gr i I f i th)  1979). In response, the Attorney 
General issued a s tatement  just i fying the pract ice  of jury vett ing in those cases 
where ordinary procedures of tr ia l  by jury might not be su l f ic ient  to ensure the 
proper administrat ion of just ice.  An examinat ion of the 25 tr ia ls  in which jury 
vett ing had been secretly authorized from 1975 to 1978 indicated that i t  occurred 
most often in pol i t ica l  tr ials or cases involving organized cr ime f igures. The 
decision to permit  jury vett ing in part icular  cases rests with the Director  of 
Public Prosecutions or the Director's deputy. Thus, before the t r ia l  begins, the 
defence is l imi ted  in all cases to the jurors' names and addresses, while in special 
cases the prosecutor may undertake with author izat ion addit ional invest igat ion of 
prospective jurors. 
[n contrast to US courts, there is l i t t le  or no opportunity in British courts to 
question jury panel members about their att i tudes towards the case at the start  of 
the t r ia l .  There have been only occasional exceptions to this rule. The most 
celebrated instance, and the one which generated the f iercest backlash, was the 
'Angry Brigade' t r ia l  in 1973. In that highly po l i t i ca l  t r ia l ,  defence barr isters 
were al lowed by the judge to ask questions of prospective jurors, including what 
newspapers they read regularly and their  po l i t i ca l  a f f i l i a t ion ,  for the purpose of 
establishing whether jurors would be biased against the defendants. Members of the 
judiciary disapproved of the range of questioning al lowed to the defence in this 
t r ia l .  As a result ,  the Lord Chief 3ustice issued a Practice Direct ion to judges, 
reminding them that 'A jury consists of twelve individuals chosen at random . . .  It 
is contrary to established pract ice for jurors to be excused on more general grounds 
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such as race, rel igion, or polit ical  beliefs or occupation' (Practice Direction) 
1973, p. 2$0). 
Broad-ranging questions have apparently not been asked of jurors since the Angry 
Brigade t r ia l .  Newspaper reports of cases involving pol i t ica l  or racial overtones 
reveal that while judges do allow some l imited examination of prospective jurors, 
the questions are relat ively narrow in scope and closely linked to the case at 
hand. For example, in two recent cases involving racial issues) prospective jurors 
were asked about their views of non-white citizens and the National Front (Pithers, 
1952b; Shirley) 1982). In another case where the organizer of the National Viewers' 
and Listeners' Association) a group attempting to promote 'decency' in the media, 
brought a private prosecution on obscenity charges against a London theatre company 
director) the judge told the jurors to declare whether they were members of the 
association (Nicholson=Lord) 1982). However, the existence of even this sort of 
l imited questioning is by all accounts quite rare. 
USA 
The amount of information available about prospective jurors to attorneys in the 
United States is almost always greater than the information provided to their 
British counterparts. First, prior to the opening of the t r ia l ,  both defence and 
prosecuting attorneys have basic information about jury panel members, such as age, 
gender, address, occupation, and relationships-with members of the police and legal 
profession, obtained from their responses to jury questionnaires sent out in most 
jurisdictions. Attorneys may also have information from police records on jury panel 
members (Okun, 196g; Bush, 1976). But the most important source of information for 
US attorneys is the voir dire questioning period which is a normal part of every 
jury tr ia l .  
During the voir dire, prospective jurors are examined by judges and/or lawyers 
concerning their qualif ications and possible prejudices in the case. While the voir 
dire is routine, the manner in which it is conducted and the amount of information 
obtained from jury panel members vary t remendous ly  f rom ju r i sd ic t ion  to 
jurisdiction. The desirabi l i ty of d i f ferent methods of conducting the voir dire has 
been the subject of considerable debate. 
One aspect of the conduct of the voir dire which is quite controversial is 
whether the judge or the attorneys should conduct the questioning of prospective 
jurors. In some American jurisdictions, voir dire is controlled exclusively by the 
judge while, in others, attorneys conduct some or all of the questioning of the jury 
panel (Bermant, 1977; Van Dyke, 1977). Many attorneys (e.g., Begarn, 1977) argue 
that lawyers should conduct the questioning and should be permitted wide latitude in 
their inquiries. They maintain that unfettered adversary questioning by attorneys 
during voir dire will be most successful in uncovering juror biases. They point out 
that the judge's status may evoke socially desirable responses from prospective 
jurors) and that judges will ask leading questions) indicate proper replies) and 
fail to probe further in response to suggestive answers.  3udges counter these claims 
(e .g . ,  Stanley) 1977) by arguing that the presence of two adversary advocates 
prevents judicial questioning from being perfunctory)  and that jurors are not so 
overawed by judges that they would vio late their oaths to answer voir dire questions 
truthful ly ,  
Another way in which voir dire may vary is in the scope of the questioning of 
prospective jurors. Depending upon the nature of the case and the tr ia l  judge's 
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d isc ret ion ,  the pre - t r ia l  examinat ion  of jurors may be res t r i c ted  to re la t ive ly  
narrow topics  (e .g . ,  age, occupat ion)  knowledge of the case and t r ia l  par t i c ipants )  
or may inc lude more expansive and probing questions about a potent ia l  jurorts 
a t t i tudes ,  exper iences ,  and preconcept ions  about a case. The extended voir  d i re 
which character izes  many t r ia ls  w i th  po l i t i ca l  and rac ia l  overtones has c reated  
debate about the appropr iateness of intens ive voir  d i re quest ion ing.  While Bush 
(1976), for  example)  has argued that  extens ive quest ioning is the best means of 
d iscover ing juror  pre jud ices ,  others c la im that  i ts ch ief  v i r tue  is to a l low 
at torneys  to abuse the voir  d i re .  
The jury panel may also be quest ioned as a group,  or each ind iv idua l  may be 
quest ioned separate ly  in or out of the presence of other  jury panel members .  While 
group quest ioning has the c lear t ime advantage,  i t  has been argued that  panel 
members learn the 'correct '  answers dur ing other  jurors ) quest ion ing ,  and that  the i r  
subsequent answers are meaningless.  Add i t iona l  negat ive  e f fec ts  of group voir  d i re 
have been documented by Haney (1980). 
Al l  these procedura l  var ia t ions  c reate  t remendous d i f fe rences  in the t ime i t  
takes to complete  the voir  d i re process.  A repor t  of voir  d i re t imes for  a sample of 
15 USA c i t ies  gave the overa l l  average for  these c i t ies  as approx imate ly  two  hours 
for  c r imina l  t r ia l s  and one hour for  c iv i l  cases, but the range was most s t r i k ing .  
The average voir  d ire t ime var ied f rom l$ minutes in one ju r i sd ic t ion  to 8.8 hours 
in another ( 'Center  for  3ury Studies News le t ter ' )  J979). And in t r ia ls  where there  
has been massive pre - t r ia l  pub l i c i ty ,  where th¢= daath pena l ty  is a poss ib i l i ty :  or 
where there are po l i t i ca l  or rac ia l  over tones ,  the jury se lect ion  can take weeks or 
months.  A recent  instance which the 'Dai ly  Telegraph'  (Brod ie ,  1982) c i ted  as 
demonst ra t ing  the super io r i ty  of the Br i t ish jury se lect ion system was the heavi ly  
publ ic ized case in Los Angeles of the 'Hi l ls ide St rangler ' .  3ury se lect ion in the 
case took 49 cour t  days. 
In some po l i t i ca l  t r ia l s ,  even more in fo rmat ion  has been gleaned to assist 
at torneys  for the defence through the use of ' sc ient i f i c '  or ' sys temat ic '  jury 
se lect ion .  The techniques of sys temat ic  jury se lect ion  were p ioneered in the 1972 
t r ia l  of the Berr igan brothers  and others on charges of conspi racy to ra id dra f t  
boards,  b low up heat ing tunnels in Washington, DC, and k idnap the Secretary  of 
State ,  Henry K iss inger .  A group of social  sc ient i s ts ,  co l laborat ing  w i th  defence 
a t to rneys ,  conducted communi ty  surveys to determine  the demograph ic  character i s t i cs  
of people favourab le  and opposed to the defendants ,  const ructed ' ideal  juror '  
p ro f i les ,  set up in fo rmat ion  networks  to obta in  data about the members of the jury 
panel ,  and observed the voir  d i re  quest ioning per iod in cour t .  The defence at torneys  
thus had a cons iderable  amount of in fo rmat ion  on which to exerc ise the i r  chal lenges 
(Schulman et a l ,  1973). 
These techniques have since been used in a number of ce lebrated  Amer ican  cases 
(Berk, 1976; Christie, 1976; Tapp & Kenniston, 1976; Zeisel & Diamond, 1976; 
McConahay, Mullin & Frederick, 1977). The practice of scientific jury selection has 
been criticized on a number of grounds. Several social scientists have pointed out 
that its effectiveness in securing a more desirable jury has not been stablished 
(Saks, 1976a, 1976b; Vidmar, 1976; Suggs & Sales, 1978). A further problem is the 
ethicality of employing such procedures, which may make a spectacle of the trial and 
give the impression, rightly or wrongly, that the jury is rigged. The reader is 
referred to Berk, Hennessy and Swan (1977), Etzioni (197#), and Saks (1976a, 1976b) 
for discussion of these issues. 
While there is a wide range to the information available about prospective 
jurors in different USA jurisdictions and different cases, even in those 
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j u r i sd ic t ions  where  the  voir  d i re  is most  l im i ted ,  more  in lo rmat ion  about  jurors  is 
ava i lab le  than  in a lmost  any case  t r ied  in Br i ta in .  
ALTEI~hiG THE COMPOSITION OF THE 3URY 
Britain 
In Br i ta in  there are three ways in which barr i s ters  may at tempt  to a l te r  the 
compos i t ion  of the ju ry .  F i rst  of a l l ,  both sides have the r ight  to chal lenge 
prospect ive jurors for  cause. Second, the defence (but  not the Crown)  may chal lenge 
up to three jurors peremptor i l y ,  w i thout  prov id ing  a reason. F ina l ly ,  the Crown (but 
not the defence)  may ask prospect ive  jurors  to 'stand by for  the Crown' .  The 
ind iv idua l  must stand by unt i l  the jury is se lected or the panel is exhausted,  in 
which case he or she may be e l ig ib le  again.  The Crown is not requ i red to show cause 
for  standing jurors by, so that  the stand by is funct iona l ly  equ iva lent  to the 
peremptory  cha l lenge.  The l i t t le  research which has been conducted on these three  
ways of a l te r ing  the compos i t ion  of the Br i t i sh  jury  ind icates  that  these methods 
are used by barr i s ters  only in a minor i ty  of cases. Let  us consider each of these 
methods in tu rn .  
Challenges for  cause may be successful i f  i t  can be demonst ra ted  that  jurors are 
so biased that  they could not be impar t ia l  in hear ing the ev idence,  i f  they have a 
specific i n te res t  in or connect ion w i th  the case, or i f  they do not meet  the 
qua l i f i ca t ions  for  jury serv ice .  However ,  the ab i l i ty  of bar r i s ters  to develop this  
sort of in fo rmat ion  about jury panel members is severely  l im i ted ,  since the 
bar r i s ter  has no r ight  to question a juror  in court  unt i l  a pr ima Iac ie  case for  a 
chal lenge is provided by other  evidence (Dev l in ,  1956; Cornish,  1968). The 
d i f f i cu l t ies  of success fu l ly  es tab l i sh ing  a juror 's  b ias  under  the  Br i t i sh  sys tem 
have made the  cha l lenge  for cause  ext remely  ra re .  Dev l in  (1956) ,  for  example ,  has 
descr ibed  the  cha l lenge  fo r  cause  a  obso lescent ,  and  another  judge  has  
commented  succ inc t ly :  'I have  never  seen  th i s  done'  (C la rke ,  1975, p. 57) .  
Peremptory  cha l lenges ,  which may be exerc i sed  by de fence  bar r i s te rs  w i thout  
prov id ing  reasons, are exerc ised more f requent ly .  The number of peremptory  
chal lenges had been seven unt i l  i t  was reduced to three  by the Cr imina l  Law Act  of 
1977. 
The data ava i lab le  on the delence's exerc ise of peremptory  chal lenges in Br i ta in  
ind icate  that  the peremptory  is used in only a minor i ty  of t r ia l s .  The Report  of the 
Depar tmenta l  Commit tee  on 3ury Service (196.5) prov ided some in format ion  about the 
f requency of peremptory  chal lenges in Centra l  Cr imina l  Court  and London Sessions 
during a three-month  per iod in 1965. In 351 jury  t r ia l s  in these two ju r i sd ic t ions ,  
chal lenges were made in only 25 t r ia l s  (7 per cent of al l  cases) for  a to ta l  of 50 
chal lenges.  More recent ly ,  Ba ldwin and McConvi l le  (1979, 1980) repor t  that  in the i r  
1975 study of 370 defendants'  t r ia l s  in B i rmingham,  defence bar r i s ters  made a to ta l  
of 101 chal lenges,  or an average of approx imate ly  one chal lenge for every four  
defendants .  
That the use of peremptory  chal lenges by Br i t i sh  bar r i s ters  has increased,  
espec ia l l y  in the  London area ,  is suggested  by a le t te r  to  'The T imes '  by 3udge 
G i lber t  F.  Les l ie  (1982) .  He repor ts  that  in approx imate ly  30 years '  exper ience  at  
the  Bar and on the  Bench in the  Nor th -Eastern  C i rcu i t  ( [932-1962 less the  war years )  
he never  saw a juror  cha l lenged and heard  of only one case  in wh ich  i t  had been 
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done. However, during his time on the bench in London (1965-1980), he observes that 
challenges were 'common', and 'are usually made because defending counsel thinks 
that the juror may be intel l igent or because the juror is white or a woman' (p. 5). 
A 1976 Metropolitan Police Force survey of the exercise of peremptory 
challenges, cited by Baldwin and McConville (1979), bears out at least some of 3udge 
Leslie's impressions. In 341 trials heard during two months of 1976 in the Old 
Bailey and Inner London Crown Court, almost a third of the defendants exercised 
their right to challenge, and 19 used all  seven of their challenges. 
In a similar vein, in several recent and heavily publicized cases involving 
mult iple defendantsp barristers have exercised many if not all of their challenges. 
For example, in one case involving 15 black youths as defendants, 37 jurors were 
stood down in i t ia l l y .  When the process of jury selection had to be repeated because 
one of the selected jurors revealed she was related to a defence barrister, there 
were 26 objections before the jury was chosen (Shirley, 1982). (This might test i fy 
to the ineff icacy of British jury selection procedures in el iminating jurors who 
have a relationship with people or issues in the case. Questions about associations 
with attorneys in the case are common during voir dire in the United States. If this 
tr ia l  had occurred in the United States, in all probabi l i ty this woman would have 
been excused by the judge during voir dire.)  Simi lar ly,  in a tr ia l  of 12 Asian 
youths for making explosive substances, defence barristers exercised all  36 of their 
challenges during jury selection (Pithers, 19g2b). Thus the notion that British 
barristers only rarely exercise peremptories is probably an outdated one. 
While, as we noted, the Crown has no right of peremptory challenge, the Crown 
possesses its functional equivalent in the right to stand jurors by for the Crown 
until the panel is depleted. Compared with the three peremptory challenges al lotted 
to the defence, the stand by confers substantial ly greater power to the Crown to 
alter the composition of the jury. If the composition of the jury is an important 
determinant of its verdict,  then the stand by provides theoret ical ly  a signif icant 
advantage to the Crown. 
It is therefore of great interest to know exactly how often and under what 
circumstances the right to stand by jurors is exercised. Histor ical ly,  there are 
many instances in which the Crown has been accused of jury packing through the 
mechanism of standing by prospective jurors. For example, McEldowney (1979) reports 
that in the nineteenth century the prosecuting attorneys in Ireland sometimes used 
their power to stand by jurors to el iminate Catholics from juries. Cornish (196g) 
describes similar experiences in the English system. In the only systematical ly 
collected information on the exercise of the stand by, Baldwin and McConvil le 
(1979, 1950) report that in tr ials of 370 defendants in Birmingham courts, the Crown 
stood by a total  of 13 prospective jurors. While the number is small, the stand by 
may be employed most often in highly pol i t ic ized cases where the propriety of its 
use wi l l  be questioned. For example, in the 1972 tr ia l  of suspected Irish Republican 
Army members, the Crown stood by six skilled labourers, for which it  was roundly 
denounced (Harman & Gr i f f i th ,  1979). 
USA 
The two methods used to alter the jury's composition in the United States are the 
challenge for cause and the peremptory challenge~ both of which are available to 
defence and prosecuting attorneys. The use of these challenges is much more frequent 
in the USA than in Britain.  
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During the voir  d i re ,  responses or in fo rmat ion  prov ided by a prospect ive  juror  
may convince the t r ia l  judge that  the ind iv idua l  could not be impar t ia l  in the case. 
In such an instance,  the judge w i l l  dismiss the person for  cause. The c r i te r ia  
judges use in excusing jurors for  cause has never been s tud ied,  but i t  is obvious 
that  d i f fe rent ia t ing  biased and unbiased ind iv idua ls  is a d i f f i cu l t  task even in the 
psychologist 's  laboratory ,  le t  a lone in the cour t room.  The courts  have o f ten  re l ied  
on a prospect ive iurorts admission of bias as the c r i te r ion  for  a successful  
chal lenge for  cause. Indeed, even jurors who admi t  the i r  biases but s tate  that  they  
could set these biases aside and decide the case before  them fa i r ly  would l i ke ly  
surv ive a chal lenge fo r  cause. 
There is a lmost  no research on the inc idence of such chal lenges,  nor on the 
jud ic ia l  dec is ion-mak ing  process invo lved in i t .  One three-year  study of New Mexico 
courts (Van Dyke,  1977) ind icated  that  5.2 per cent of prospect ive  jurors were 
excused for  cause. If this f igure is a re l iab le  ind icat ion  of the percentage of 
jurors excused for cause in other  ju r i sd ic t ions ,  i t  would be of in teres t  to know 
more about the process that  e l iminates  one in 20 jurors f rom serv ice .  
The most w ide ly  employed method of e l iminat ing  people f rom the jury  in the USA 
is the peremptory  chal lenge.  Both defence and prosecut ing a t torneys  are assigned a 
set number of peremptory  chal lenges,  the quant i ty  depending on the type of c r ime,  
the number of defendants,  and the ju r i sd ic t ion .  For example ,  in the federa l  courts  
in fe lony  cases,  each s ide is g iven  f ive  peremptory  cha l lenges ,  wh i le  in 
misdemeanour cases only two chal lenges each are prov ided .  In the state courts  in 
fe lony cases, the two sides are most f requent ly  given six chal lenges each, but the 
range is f rom 3 to 20. The number of peremptor ies  a l lo t ted  to prosecut ion and 
defence is o f ten equal ,  but i f  there  is a d i f fe rence  i t  w i l l  be in favour  of the 
defence (Van Dyke,  1977). 
There has been l i t t le  sys temat ic  study of the exerc ise  of peremptor ies ,  but the 
l i t t le  that  is ava i lab le  ind icates  that  at torneys  use the i r  peremptor ies  w i th  some 
f requency.  In one three-year  study of New Mexico cour ts ,  7.4 per cent of jury panel 
members were chal lenged peremptor i l y  by the prosecut ion ,  whi le  22.7 per cent of 
prospect ive jurors were chal lenged by the defence (Van Dyke,  1977). 
The sharpest c r i t i c i sm over the exerc ise of peremptory  chal lenges has concerned 
the use of these chal lenges by prosecutors  to e l iminate  members  of rac ia l  and ethn ic  
groups f rom jur ies (Kuhn, 1968). This issue was raised in a famous Amer ican  case~ 
Swain v. A labama (196~), where a b lack man was conv ic ted  and sentenced to  death for  
rape.  While e ight  blacks were on the jury  panel ,  two  were excused f rom serv ice and 
the other  six were chal Ienged peremptor i l y  by the prosecutor .  A number of o ther  
instances of the prosecution's use of peremptor ies  to e l iminate  rac ia l  groups f rom 
jury service have been documented (Van Dyke,  1977). 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN 3URY SELECTION 
While a fu l l  t reatment  is beyond the scope of this paper ,  i t  is in teres t ing  to 
speculate about why Br i ta in  and the United States have developed such d ivergent  jury  
se lect ion pract i ces .  In par t i cu la r ,  why should jury se lect ion  procedures be so much 
more expanded in the United States? Cornish (196g) points  out that ,  in Amer ica ,  
jur ies have been prov ided w i th  greater  powers ,  so that  the compos i t ion  of the jury 
has assumed greater  impor tance .  Marshal l  (1975) argues that  a number of 
const i tu t iona l  and cu l tura l  d i f fe rences  between the two countr ies  may help to 
expla in the greater  emphasis the Uni ted States places on jury se lect ion .  He notes 
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that  the judicial  system in Br i ta in  is character i zed  by a lack of genera l  legal  
guarantees  of due process and equal p ro tect ion)  while the r ight  to t r ia l  by an 
impar t ia l  jury is enshrined in the US Const i tu t ion .  Fur thermore ,  he mainta ins  that ,  
in the past ,  rac ia l  and rel igious d i f fe rences  in Br i ta in  have not been as sa l ient  in 
the t r ia l s  of c r imina l  cases as in the United States .  
Another  difference between the count r ies  is the  f reedom accorded to the press to 
report  mat ters  which may eventua l ly  be t r ied  in cour t .  In the United States ,  g reat  
value has been placed on f reedom of the press.  As a consequence ,  p rospect ive  jurors 
in America are o f ten  exposed to a wide range of in fo rmat ion  about  a case before  
being cal led to sit as jurors.  In cont ras t ,  the s t r i c t  guidel ines spec i f ied in the 
Contempt  of Court Act (Young, 1981) prohib i t  all but the barest  repor t ing  of mat ters  
per ta in ing  to tr ia ls  in Br i ta in .  Br it ish jurors are as a rule unl ikely to have been 
exposed to pre judic ia l  p re - t r ia l  pub l ic i ty ,  which lessens the need for scrut iny  of 
jurors'  a t t i tudes .  
The comparat ive  review of jury selection pract i ces  in Br i ta in  and the USA has 
shown a s imi lar adherence  to the not ion of the representat ive  jury,  but g reater  
emphasis  on the in -cour t  se lect ion  of the jury in the United States ,  with more 
in fo rmat ion  about prospect ive  jurors developed during voir dire and more f requent  
a t tempts  by a t to rneys  to change the compos i t ion  of the jury through cha l lenges .  A 
number of in teres t ing  psychological  quest ions is provoked by juxtapos ing these  
d ivergent  pract i ces .  Given that  a t to rneys  a t tempt  more st renuous ly  to a l ter  the 
composi t ion of the  jury in the USA, just how impor tant  is the make-up  of the  jury in 
determining its verd ic t?  What type of in fo rmat ion  is most predictive of jurors '  
decis ions? How e f fec t ive  are a t to rneys  in picking a sympathet ic  jury? Does the use 
of d i f fe rent  p rocedures  enab le  lawyers  to exerc i se  the i r  cha l lenges  more  
e f fec t ive ly?  F inal ly ,  do d i f fe rent  methods for se lec t ing  jurors have broader  impact  
on the jurors themse lves  and on percept ions  of the leg i t imacy  of the t r ia l?  These 
issues are impor tant  ones not only for an international compar ison but also for 
their  cent ra l i ty  in the ongoing debates  in both count r ies  about  the des i rab i l i ty  of 
d i f fe rent  jury se lect ion  methods .  
Importance of 3ury Composition 
The key assumpt ion underly ing the whole process of jury se lect ion  is that  indiv idual  
differences will lead jurors to perce ive  and decide cases d i f fe rent ly .  It is obvious 
from looking at the typica l  var iab i l i ty  in exper imenta l  s imulat ion  studies and in 
real jur ies (e .g . ,  most juries'  f i rs t  ba l lots  are not unanimous;  Kalven & Zeise l ,  
1966) that  people do di f fer  to some degree in the i r  percept ions  and decis ions about  
t r ia l s .  Given this fac t ,  are there  ident i f iab le  personal  character i s t i cs  such as 
demographic  data  or a t t i tudes  that  are assoc ia ted  in a regular  and sys temat ic  way 
with differences in react ions  to t r ia l s?  
Social psychologists  have examined this quest ion through the conduct  of a 
considerable number  of jury s imulat ion s tud ies .  It would be redundant  o rev iew that  
research  here ,  s ince comprehens ive  surveys are ava i lab le  (Davis,  Bray & Holt ,  1977; 
Saks & Hast ie ,  1978; Nemeth,  1981; see also Sealy) 1981). In these  s tud ies ,  
persona l i ty  and demographic var iab les  such as age,  gender ,  race)  educat ion)  prev ious 
jury serv ice ,  author i ta r ian ism,  and moral  reasoning abi l i ty  have all been found to 
be s ign i f i cant ly  re la ted  to verd ic ts .  However,  the manner  in which any one of these  
character i s t i cs  a f fec ts  dec is ion-making d i f fers  across types of cases and s tud ies .  
For example ,  while a major i ty  of studies shows no dif ference between men and women 
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in juror decision-making) a few studies report women to be more defence oriented, 
while studies involving the crime of rape have demonstrated a consistent tendency 
for women to be more prosecution prone (Hans, 1982). 
Individual characteristics showing a stat ist ical ly  signif icant dif ference in 
simulation studies may sti l l  be re lat ively unimportant in the overall  determination 
of verdicts. Several researchers have addressed this point by obtaining demographic 
and att i tudinal  information from subjects and then attempting to predict their 
decisions in simulated cases. For example, Penrod (1980) col lected demographic and 
att i tudinal  data from a heterogeneous sample of 367 subjects who subsequently 
rendered verdicts in four d i f ferent types of cases. He then employed regression 
analyses to determine the degree to which decisions in the four cases could be 
predicted from jurors' personal characteristics. The results were str iking. The 
regression models could account for only 5 to 16 per cent of the variance, depending 
on the case. Out of 48 correlations between att i tude variables and verdict 
preferences ,  seven were stat ist ical ly s igni f icant .  The highest correlat ion,  just 
0.26, was between answers to a question tapping attitudes towards rape and verdicts 
in the rape case. Dashing the hopes of those looking for the prosecution-prone or 
defence-oriented individual,  intercorrelat ions among verdicts in the four cases 
were all quite low. Indeed, the strongest relationship was a negative correlat ion of 
-0.13 between verdicts in the rape and murder cases. 
in a similar vein, Hepburn (1980) correlated simulated jurors' demographic and 
att i tudinal  characteristics with their verdicts in a felony-murder case. His study, 
too, demonstrated only low to moderate correlations between these variables. Nine 
demographic predictors accounted for 8 per cent of the variance, while att itudes 
towards the police and punishment separately accounted for under 10 per cent of the 
var iabi l i ty  in decisions. 
A potent ia l ly  more product ive st rategy may be to examine more speci f ica l ly  the 
relationship between case character i s t i cs ,  at t i tudes towards the case,  and 
personal i ty-demographic  var iables.  This or ientat ion is suggested by the bulk of 
social psychology research on att i tudes and behaviour (e .g . ,  Fishbein & Ajzen) 
1975)) indicat ing that greater  spec i f ic i ty  typical ly  improves predict ion.  3ust such 
an approach was taken by Feild (1978) in his exper imenta l  study of decisions in rape 
tr ia ls .  He systemat ica l ly  varied a number of case factors  (such as race of the 
defendant, sexual experience of the vict im) precipitory versus non-precipitory type 
of rape) in versions of rape cases presented to 896 adult subjects. He obtained 
demographic information and tapped attitudes towards rape by means of a 
questionnaire. He found only negligible correlations between case characterist ic and 
demographic dimensions and simulated jurors' responses, but the relationship between 
attitudes towards rape and case judgements was stronger. The largest mult iple 
correlat ion, with eight att i tudinal  predictors, was 0.51. Taken in the context of 
other studies showing only weak relationships among variables, this result suggests 
that, in line with psychological research on att itudes and behaviour, case-specific 
att i tudinal  questions are the best predictors of jurors' decisions. However) it  must 
be mentioned that in contrast to the Hepburn and Penrod studies, Feild correlated 
attitudes not with jurors' verdicts but rather with their recommendations for prison 
sentences, which may have contributed to the higher correlations. 
A f inal tact ic employed by researchers to examine the effects of personal 
characteristics on jurors' verdicts has been to relate jury composition to the 
decisions reached by real jur ies.  In Baldwin and McConvil le's (1979, 1980) study of 
Birmingham Crown Court juries, they co l lected background informat ion on 3912 jurors 
(members of 326 juries) who heard cases over the 2].-mor~th study per iod.  They 
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examined the pattern of verdicts returned by juries varying in composition along the 
dimensions of age~ gender~ and occupation~ but found no discernible associations 
with jury verdicts. Similarlyp a study of acquittal  rates in British Crown Courts 
before and after the quali f ications for jury service were revised revealed no 
detectable differences as a function of the reform (Zander9 1975~ 1975). 
While these studies suggest that the impact of demographic variables on jury 
decision-making is unimportant~ it should be pointed out that the power of the real 
world studies to detect effects is l ikely to be quite weak. As Lempert (1975) has 
argued persuasively in another context~ even when a variable undoubtedly influences 
jury verdicts in some cases9 its effects are l ikely to be so diluted in real world 
research studies as to appear inconsequential. 
Another issue involves the relationship between individual differences and 
behaviour in the jury room, since onews contribution to the f inal verdict depends 
upon ef fect ive ly  presenting one's perspective to other members of the jury. Consider 
those studies of jury behaviour which show that tradit ional  status inequalit ies 
between the sexes are carried into the jury room~ with men chosen more frequently as 
leaders p part ic ipating more in deliberations~ and perceived as more inf luent ia l  
(Hans~ 19521 Stasser9 Kerr & Bray~ 1952). All these differences may impede woments 
performance on the jury and may help to explain why their presence has no detectable 
impact on verdicts. The more general point is that in calculating the effects of 
individual variations in verdict preferences one must necessarily take into account 
how those differences wil l  be diiuted~ reinforced~ or transformed in the social 
environment of jury del iberation and decision-making. 
In summary9 while individual characteristics may affect  juror decision-makingy 
their impact is low to moderate and may di f fer  from case to case. In real world and 
jury simulation studies al ike, personality and demographic variables are found to be 
weakly or inconsistently related to jury decision-making. As one would expect from 
psychological research9 the relationships between attitudes towards cases and juror 
decisions are somewhat stronger. Even under the best of circumstances~ however, i t  
is d i f f icu l t  to predict accurately jurors' verdicts from knowledge of their personal 
characteristics. 
The research indicates that lawyers who rely exclusively on demographic 
variables such as age, race, and gender to alter the composition of the jury are in 
all probabi l i ty engaging in a fruitless endeavour. Yet if they wish to exercise 
the i r  chal lenges,  Br i t ish barr is ters  are forced to re ly on such personal  
characteristics. A similar situation confronts American attorneys in jurisdictions 
with l im i ted  voir  d i re .  It is only in those s i tuat ions  where lawyers gain 
information about case-specific att itudes and experiences of prospective jurors, the 
sort of information developed during extended voir dire~ that attorney judgements 
about jurors' biases are l ikely to be rel iable.  
Before leaving the topic of jury composition~ it is worth drawing attention to 
the assumption~ widely shared in both Britain and Americay that representative 
juries possess superior fact- f inding abi l i t ies.  Proponents of representative juries 
maintain that a jury composed of individuals with varied perspectives wil l  promote 
robust deliberation~ the cancellation of opposing biases~ and better fact f inding. 
These arguments are largely untested, although studies in group decision-making do 
indicate that heterogeneous groups are frequently better at problem solving than 
homogeneous groups (Hoffman~ 1965). Research on these psychological assumptions 
would be of value. 
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Attorney Effectiveness 
While the psychological research suggests, especial ly under conditions of l im i ted  
informat ion about prospective jurors,  that attorneys are l ikely to be only min imal ly  
e f fect ive  in picking a sympathetic jury,  lawyers themselves wi l l  maintain that  they 
have won or lost cases by choosing the jury part icu lar ly  b r i l l i ant ly  or badly.  Few 
systematical ly  col lected data concerning attorney effectiveness are avai lable,  
however. In Broeder's (1965) American study of the voir dire process in 23 jury 
t r ia ls ,  examples from post - t r ia l  interviews with jurors demonstrated that the voir 
dire and jury selection process were sometimes inef fect ive  in weeding out biased 
persons from the jury.  Blauner (1972), on the other hand, provides i l lustrat ions of 
the considerable ab i l i ty  of the defence attorney in the Huey Newton murder t r ia l  in 
uncovering hidden prejudices in prospective jurors. In Broeder's research, the voir 
dire was perfunctory,  while the Huey Newton voir dire const i tuted one of the f i rs t  
times in which extensive voir dire questioning was permi t ted  in an American court .  
Although the evidence about d i f fe rent ia l  attorney effectiveness is only anecdotal ,  
the pattern supports the conclusion advanced ear l ier  that extended voir dire wi l l  be 
most useful in discovering juror bias. Correspondingly, Nietzel  and Dil lehay (1982) 
have found, in their study of var iat ion in voir dire practices in death penalty 
cases) that defence attorneys' challenges for cause are most often successful when 
voir dire is conducted with jurors indiv idual ly  and out of the presence of other 
jury panel members in contrast to en masse questioning of the panel. 
A recent and inventive study by Zeisel and Diamond (1975) is the only one which 
provides direct  informat ion about attorney effectiveness over a number of cases. 
Usually, of course, it is impossible to know how successful a lawyer is in 
exercising challenges) since prospective jurors who are challenged are removed from 
the jury and do not render a decision in the case. In Zeisel and Diamond's 
experiment)  however) they arranged for the challenged jurors in 12 cases to sit in 
court during the t r ia l  and vote at its conclusion. Information about the challenged 
jurors' votes) along with post - t r ia l  interviews with jurors to obtain the f i rs t  
bal lot votes of the real jury,  al lowed Zeisel and Diamond to reconstruct what the 
f i rst  bal lot  vote of the iury would have been without  any peremptory challenges. 
This comparison of the real and reconstructed juries' f i rst  bal lot  votes al lowed 
them to est imate the effectiveness of the attorneys' exercise of their  peremptor ies.  
Zeisel and Diamond's analysis indicated that in two or three of the 12 t r ia ls)  the 
differences between f irst  bal lot votes were large enough to have produced d i f ferent  
verdicts.  Thus, in two or three instances, attorneys' challenges appeared to be 
e f fect ive .  Zeisel and Diamond also calculated an attorney performance index, based 
on the challenged jurors' votes, which revealed great var iat ion in lawyers' 
abi l i t ies to e l iminate jurors who were biased against their  case. In addit ion,  the 
researchers in each case obtained decisions from 12 randomly selected jury panel 
members who had not undergone voir dire) a group they christened the 'English jury' .  
Members of the English juries were more l ikely to convict the defendant than members 
of the real jur ies,  but it is unclear whether their  convict ion proneness was due to 
attorney ski l l ,  the fact that they had not been through the voir dire process) or 
the fact  that they were not in real i ty  deciding someone's fa te .  
As we might have expected, the research on attorney effect iveness,  while not 
extensive, indicates that especially where attorneys operate under conditions of 
l imi ted information about jury panel members their  effectiveness is only marginal .  
This suggests that the greater use of challenges in the USA compared with Britain 
may actual ly make l i t t le  di f ference in the eventual outcome of the case. 
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Other Ef fec ts  o f  3ury Selection Procedures 
In addition to its assistance to lawyers in choosing a sympathetic jury, the manner 
in which jury selection is conducted may have a psychological impact on the jurors 
themselves and may affect perceptions of the legit imacy of the jury and its 
verdict.  
Observers of jury selection in the United States have frequently noted that the 
voir dire process serves a variety of functions beyond the detection of bias in 
prospective jurors. Attorneys may use the voir dire to cult ivate rapport with 
jurors) to develop tr ia l  strategy, to forewarn jurors about negative evidence in the 
case, and to educate the jurors about important legal issues (Bailey & Rothblatt ,  
1971). Balch et al (1976) and Broeder (1965) have documented the prevalence of 
educative and instructional strategies of lawyers during voir dire examinations. 
McConahay, Mullin and Frederick (1977) speculate that the scienti f ic jury selection 
techniques they employed in the 3oan L i t t le  t r ia l  may have had a placebo effect  on 
jurors. Because the jurors had been chosen by defence experts, they may have fe l t  
more favourable towards the defence, and the extensive voir dire may have 
indoctrinated jurors about being impart ia l .  
More deleterious effects of a pre-tr ia l  question period have been reported by 
Haney (1980)) who used simulation methodology to explore the ef:[ects of the death 
qual i f icat ion process on jurors, in capital cases in the USA, the voir dire includes 
a series of questions designed to determine whether jurors have such strong feelings 
about the death penalty that they could not be fair and impart ia l  jurors. Haney 
presented subjects with videotapes depicting jury selection in a f irst-degree murder 
case. Subjects whose videotape included a series of questions on the death penalty 
were much more prosecution prone in their perceptions of and judgements about the 
case than subjects who observed a jury selection videotape without a death 
qual i f icat ion segment. Whether jurors make similar negative inferences from extended 
voir dire) or whether the voir dire is ef fect ive in educating them about their 
roles, are questions awaiting systematic empirical investigation. 
A f inal point to which we have alluded previously is that jury selection 
practices may affect  the legit imacy ol the jury. It is possible, especially in 
trials where the l ikel ihood of juror bias is great) that extensive jury selection 
procedures (involving considerable in-depth questioning of jury panel members and 
l iberal use of challenges for cause) wi l l  reassure the court, the defendant, and the 
public that every attempt has been made to secure an impart ia l  jury. A l ternat ive ly ,  
such procedures might undermine the legit imacy of the jury and its verdict (e .g . ,  
see Wellman & Fitzgerald's 1978 discussion o£ the prosecution's advantage in the 
voir dire process in pol i t ical  t r ia ls) .  We have already noted the l imited tolerance 
in Britain for questioning the jury panel and for tampering with the composition of 
the jury. Indeed, there have even been calls for eradicating the defence's l imited 
right of peremptory challenge in Britain ('The Times', 1977; Sabin, 1982). Others 
have argued convincingly that the Crown's v i r tual ly  unl imited power to stand by 
jurors confers an unfair advantage to the state which contradicts the idea of t r ia l  
by an impart ial  jury; such a power must be curtai led to preserve the legit imacy of 
jury tr ial  (Thompson, I978; Harman & Gr i f f i th ,  1979; McEldowney, 1979). In the USA, 
the el imination of minority group members through the prosecutors' use of peremptory 
challenges has also detr imental ly affected perceptions of the tr ia l  (Note: the case 
for black juries) 1970). Final ly,  objections to scient i f ic  jury selection have 
included feelings that it made the tr ia l  a sham, provoked perceptions that the jury 
was rigged) and threatened the val id i ty of any verdict reached by a sc ient i f ica l ly  
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selected jury (Etzioni, 197¢; Berk, Hennessy & Swan, 1977). It would be of interest 
to examine how percept ions of the t r ia l  are a f fec ted  by var ia t ion  in the 
extensiveness of jury selection, for clearly these issues of legit imacy are 
important considerations in jury selection reform. 
CONCLUSION 
Our psychological perspective on jury selection in two countries indicates that 
American attorneys have an important advantage over British barristers in the type 
of information about jurors that can be obtained during voir dire questioning in 
American courts. Research on the relationship between demographic characteristics 
and juror verdicts, coupled with British jury selection practices, suggests that 
British lawyers wi l l  rarely if ever have enough data about prospective jurors to 
exercise their challenges (or stand bys) e f fect ive ly .  Even in the USA, cases with 
extended voir dire are l ikely to be the only ones in which solid predict ive data 
wil l  be el ic i ted.  Studies offering proof of minimal attorney effectiveness in the 
exercise of peremptory challenges suggest that the typical British jury which is 
randomly selected from the jury panel may be essentially the same as the typical  
American jury chosen with voir dire and peremptory challenges by prosecution and 
defence attorneys. 
In this l ight it  wi l l  be reassuring to note the evidence showing that,  overal l ,  
jury composition is not the important determinant of the jury's verdict that 
fo lk lo re  imp l ies .  In the vast ma jor i ty  of t r ia l s  the jury's verd ic t  w i l l  be 
identical to the one the judge would have reached (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). 
Nevertheless, in cases which are close or which involve important pol i t ical  and 
social issues l ikely to polarize jurors, the selection of the jury, and the methods 
involved in selection) may assume greater importance. Our survey of psychological 
issues in jury selection also highlights what may well  be the most cr i t ica l  feature 
of the selection process= its psychological impact on the public and on the jurors 
themselves. 
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